Category: svrprbyg

The Killing of Sister George Begins Performances Off-Broadway

The Killing of Sister George Begins Performances Off-Broadway

first_img In The Killing of Sister George, gin-swilling, cigar-chomping June Buckridge (O’Connell) plays the beloved Sister George on the popular BBC Radio drama, Applehurst. When it looks like BBC executives might kill off Sister George to raise ratings, June’s precarious personal world heads into a tailspin. The drama was first produced in England in 1964, with a cast that included Beryl Reid and Eileen Atkins. The production transferred to Broadway in 1965, garnering a Tony award for Reid and a nod for Atkins. The 1968 film adaptation starred Reid, Susannah York and Coral Browne. View Comments Show Closed This production ended its run on Nov. 1, 2014 Caitlin O’Connell, Cynthia Harris, Darrie Lawrence and Margot White start performances on September 23 in the first New York revival of Frank Marcus’ The Killing of Sister George. Directed by Drew Barr, the off-Broadway production will play a limited engagement through November 1. Opening night is set for October 7 at Theatre Row’s Beckett Theatre. The Killing of Sister George Related Showslast_img read more

Billy Porter Returns to Broadway’s Kinky Boots

Billy Porter Returns to Broadway’s Kinky Boots

first_img Kinky Boots Related Shows View Comments Show Closed This production ended its run on April 7, 2019 Dancing in heels: It’s like riding a bike, right? Tony Award winner Billy Porter slips on the red thigh-highs once again in the Broadway production of Kinky Boots. He replaces Kyle Taylor Parker, who stepped in temporarily at the Al Hirschfeld Theatre while Porter directed The Colored Museum at the Huntington Theatre Company in Boston.Parker originated the role in the first national tour of the Tony-winning musical and will return to the road to headline the show. Porter is scheduled to appear on Broadway through January 2016. He will head to his hometown of Pittsburgh from August 4 through August 9 to star in the tour. Parker will return to the Great White Way during that time.Porter took home a Tony Award in 2013 for his star performance as Lola in the Cyndi Lauper and Harvey Fierstein tuner. His additional Broadway credits include Smokey Joe’s Café, Grease, Five Guys Named Moe and Miss Saigon. Last year, he made his playwriting debut with the semi-autobiographical While I Yet Live off-Broadway.The show follows Charlie Price as he is forced to step in and save his family’s shoe factory in Northern England after the sudden death of his father. Help comes from the unlikeliest angel, a fabulous drag performer named Lola. Together, this improbable duo revitalizes the nearly bankrupt business and transforms an entire community through the power of acceptance.The current Broadway cast includes Andy Kelso as Charlie, Jeanna de Waal as Lauren, Courtney Wolfson as Nicola, Daniel Stewart Sherman as Don and Marcus Neville as George.last_img read more

CVPS to purchase Vermont Marble Power Division from Omya for $33.2 million

CVPS to purchase Vermont Marble Power Division from Omya for $33.2 million

first_imgCentral Vermont Public Service today announced that it will purchase the assets and service territory of the Vermont Marble Power Division of Omya Inc. for $33.2 million.Included in the sale are rights to serve about 890 customers in Proctor, including the Omya industrial facility in Florence, which will become CV s single-largest customer. Significantly, the sale also includes four hydroelectric facilities with a combined capacity of 18.1 megawatts. This purchase will create economies of scale that will benefit all of our customers, and will lead to expansion of the generation output from the four Vermont Marble dams through increased investment, CVPS President Bob Young said. It maintains Vermont control over the plants, which produce clean, reliable energy, and expands CV s role as the operator of the largest fleet of renewable hydroelectric generators in the state.Young said there would be significant benefits to the purchase:* It continues the state-supported consolidation of Vermont s electric utilities, creating further economies of scale.* CV will invest in upgrades and repairs that will improve hydroelectric output from the plants. CV plans to invest $12 million to upgrade the Vermont Marble facilities and operate them in consort with CV s existing Otter Creek hydro operations.* CV will invest in the Vermont Marble system, immediately replacing the main substation at the Proctor hydro site and spreading the approximate $1.5 million cost over CV s 159,000 customers rather than just Vermont Marble s customers.* CV will be able to provide Proctor residents and businesses with greater resources. For example, in the event of major storms, CV has nearly 30 line workers within an hour s drive of Proctor.* CV offers choices and services Vermont Marble customers don t have today, including automatic bill payments through CVPS Electripay, on-line bill payments, CVPS Cow Power ¢, various rate choices, budget billing, on-line bill review and outage information, and in the near future, CVPS SmartPower ¢, an advanced automated meter reading, outage detection and power management system. We welcome the opportunity to serve the people and businesses of Proctor that we don t currently serve, Young said.Other than industrial rates, Vermont Marble currently has the lowest rates in Vermont, largely because the company has subsidized residential customers for decades.Vermont Marble recently filed a rate case and rate redesign proposal which may increase residential rates increase up to nearly 24 percent absent the sale. Additionally, Vermont Marble said it has told state regulators it will need further increases if it maintains ownership of the company over the next couple of years, in part due to the substation work that is needed.Depending on how the rate design portion of Vermont Marble s case is concluded, small commercial and streetlighting rates may be higher than CV s rates. Residential customers are likely to pay more with CV, but the impact is unclear pending outcome of the Vermont Marble case, which will conclude before the sale. Even for those customers who pay more, I believe CV will represent a good value, Young said. We continue to offer rates that are among the lowest of any major utility in the Northeast. We continue to score extremely high in customer satisfaction studies conducted by J.D. Power and Associates, and we continue to excel in customer service and reliability, meeting all of our 17 service quality and reliability standards for six straight years the best record in the state.The reliability of power to VMPD s customers will remain consistent as the transaction takes place.The sale, expected to be completed by year-end 2010, is subject to the approval process set forth by the Vermont Public Service Board. The transaction also requires approval of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.Source: CVPS. 5.4.2010last_img read more

Parallels in Narcoterrorism

Parallels in Narcoterrorism

first_imgBy Dialogo January 01, 2010 With the great increases in insecurity in Afghanistan since 2006 and President Barack Obama’s decision to increase U.S. military presence in Afghanistan by 30,000 soldiers, analysts and policymakers are looking for analogies to understand the conflict’s dynamics and speculate on the counterinsurgency effort’s outcome. One of the analogies is the counternarcotics and counterinsurgency campaign in Colombia. There are striking similarities between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, and its relationship to the drug economy in Colombia and the Taliban’s relationship to the drug economy in Afghanistan. After all, Colombia has been the world’s largest producer of coca and cocaine for more than 15 years, much like Afghanistan has been for poppy and opium. Those who embrace this analogy argue that the Taliban and the FARC are essentially narcotraffickers with access to vast drug profits — on the order of tens or hundreds of millions of dollars a year — with which they can acquire sophisticated weapons and hire thousands of combatants. IDEOLOGY VERSUS PROFIT AS MOTIVATION Many analyses of the violent conflict in Colombia today describe the persistent violence there as motivated purely by the desire for financial profit. There is no doubt the intensity of ideology in the Colombian conflict has declined substantially over the years. The reasons are several. Unlike in the case of Peru’s Shining Path, for example, the FARC’s socialist ideology was never well-defined to begin with, and the demise of its old leadership and its isolation from the rest of the country only further decimated the group’s intellectual capacity during the past several years. Progressively, the FARC came to first tolerate, then tax, and later even regulate both cultivation and at least some processing. The FARC’s international drug trafficking capabilities have been greatly weakened by the Colombian military’s increased force levels and improvements. It has been selling its coca paste and cocaine mainly to Colombian drug trafficking groups and Mexican drug organizations. The Taliban became aware of the opium economy in Helmand Province in late 1994 and early 1995, and prohibited poppy cultivation as it violates the Quran. However, as this proved politically unsustainable even among its core constituencies in Helmand, by 1996 the Taliban adopted a laissez-faire approach to drug cultivation that progressively evolved into taxing the farmers as well as providing security for and taxing the traffickers. The new edicts the Taliban issued read: “The cultivation of and trading in chers [cannabis, used for hashish] is forbidden absolutely.” The consumption of opiates is forbidden, as is the manufacture of heroin, but the production and trading in opium is not forbidden. In practice, however, heroin labs were not busted and trafficking with heroin was not interdicted. The 10 percent tax on opium, formerly paid to the village mullahs, was now directed to the Taliban’s treasury, earning an estimated $9 million in 1996-97, from the south’s regular output of 1,500 tons of opium. A 10 percent “zakat,” or religious tax, was also levied on the traffickers. As the 1990s progressed, these taxes were increased to 20 percent, generating $45 million to $200 million a year. In 2000, the Taliban surprisingly banned poppy cultivation once again. The absence of viable alternative means of subsistence and income drove the majority of landowners and sharecroppers heavily into debt. While banning opium cultivation, the Taliban did not ban or otherwise attempt to interfere with the sale and trafficking of opium and heroin during that period. In choosing to curb the production, the Taliban was balancing its domestic popular legitimacy with its international legitimacy, which was severely undermined by the regime’s brutality and violations of human rights, treatment of women, sheltering of al-Qaida, and the vast poppy cultivation. The second motivation that likely drove the Taliban’s decision to impose the ban on cultivation was the desire to boost the price of opium and consolidate its control over the heroin trade. THE FARC, THE TALIBAN AND DRUG FINANCING Regarding both groups, their actual levels of profit from the drug trade are highly disputed. In the case of the FARC, drug revenue constitutes about 50 percent of its income. The rest comes from income from other illicit economies, including smuggling gas from Ecuador and Venezuela, siphoning oil from Colombian pipelines and extortion and smuggling rackets for legal goods such as cigarettes. The evidence suggests that eradication efforts reduced the FARC’s profits, but not enough to cripple the insurgency. However, the creation of military zones of encirclement within coca-growing areas, where the FARC has been pinned down by military action, has substantially curtailed its income. A study released by the White House said the FARC’s annual drug profits fell by a third between 2003 and 2005; in 2007 they were estimated at $60 million to $115 million a year, The Washington Post reported. But the guerrillas adapted by switching to other illicit economies, including extortion and kidnapping, and even made some efforts to trade in low-grade uranium. Drug income estimates for the Taliban vary widely, from tens of millions to hundreds of millions a year. Drugs constitute only a portion of the Taliban’s income, somewhere between 20 and 50 percent. This income comes from taxation of poppy fields as payment for their protection and taxation of drug traffickers’ labs and convoys. The Taliban are believed to have access to drug smuggling networks in Pakistan, and Afghan refugees participate in these networks. Other sources of Taliban income include taxation of all economic areas where they have a strong presence, illicit logging, illicit trade in wildlife and donations from Pakistan and the larger Middle East. Efforts to eradicate the poppy crop, undertaken in Afghanistan with varying degrees of intensity between 2003 and 2008, have so far had little effect on Taliban finances. THE FARC, THE TALIBAN AND POLITICAL CAPITAL Both the FARC and the Taliban derive substantial political capital from their sponsorship of the illicit drug economy. By doing so, they protect the population’s basic, reliable, and frequently sole livelihood; and they can mobilize the illicit economy for the provision of various social services underwritten by profits from drugs. Political capital in this context means legitimacy with and support from the population and its willingness to deny intelligence on the group to government forces. An important reason for the decrease of the FARC’s political capital has been its decision to take control over coca paste sales, push out small traffickers and set monopoly prices for coca paste. The FARC did this in order to deprive the paramilitaries of profits from this higher-value phase of the trade. When the FARC eliminated small traffickers from the territories under its control, it not only stopped bargaining on behalf of the coca growers for better prices and working conditions as it used to, but it started abusing them in other ways. For example, the FARC is now setting lower prices for coca paste and is sometimes unable to pay for it. The Taliban, on the other hand, is not facing any decrease in political capital as a result of its “mismanagement” of the illicit economy, because unlike the FARC, it never provided an expanded menu of regulatory and protection functions. COUNTERNARCOTICS AND COUNTERINSURGENCY POLICIES A defining characteristic of the FARC could be its longevity. The drug economy has given the FARC extended life by providing the group not only with vast financial resources but also with steady political capital among the population dependent on the illicit economy. Analysis has shown that the Colombian military has been able to substantially weaken the FARC even though efforts to destroy its income through eradication have not succeeded. Instead, success against the FARC came from the Colombian military’s improved tactics and strategy and from better resourcing its military campaign. Palpable security improvements in Colombia are undeniable: the FARC is no longer stationed on the hills above Bogotá, nor does it have a stranglehold on Colombian cities further away. NATO is struggling to reverse the trends in a similar way in Afghanistan and wrest the momentum away from the Taliban. President Barack Obama’s counternarcotics strategy for Afghanistan, announced in the summer of 2009, promises to mesh well with the counterinsurgency and state-building effort. Opium in Afghanistan The U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime found that land used for opium cultivation decreased 22 percent from 2008 to 2009 due to government leadership, an aggressive counternarcotics offensive and the introduction of food zones to promote legal farming. During that time, the opium yield decreased 10 percent, to 6,900 tons, because farmers extracted more opium per bulb. Evolution of the FARC Besides its increasing involvement in narcotrafficking to obtain profits, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, is changing the way it conducts warfare. The terrorist group is trying to develop a new generation of urban militants, said Román Ortiz, lead analyst for the security and defense consultancy Triarius Group of Colombia. “[There is an] emphasis on recruitment of university students to become urban operatives to develop urban terrorism operations,” Ortiz said. FARC is also hiring gang members to carry out terrorist attacks. Even though its membership has decreased from an estimated 17,000 guerrillas to about 8,000, this reduction could make the group more cohesive in coordinating terms, he added. In their desperate attempt to obtain followers, the FARC is shifting from Marxism to Bolivarianism. This ideology, which emerged in the 1980s, is similar to socialism but does not forbid private property. “Instead of focusing on a political system of parties, it gives a bigger role to charismatic leaders.” Their international connections are playing a bigger role. “They have developed a global logistic network: They can move narcotics in Mexico or Brazil and at the same time buy weapons in Jordan or China or Eastern Europe,” Ortiz said. Indoctrination has also expanded internationally. The group is training and giving political advice to radical groups across Latin America, following a tactic pioneered by the terrorist group al-Qaida. center_img Vanda Felbab-Brown is the author of Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs and an expert on international security implications of illicit economies and strategies for managing them. Edited from the article “Narco-Belligerents across the Globe: Lessons from Colombia for Afghanistan?” published by Real Instituto Elcano. To see the article in its entirety, go to www.realinstitutoelcano.org. Moreover, the end of the Cold War discredited socialist teachings of violent revolution of the masses and their resonance among Latin America’s citizens. Bolivarianism, a 21st century version of socialist populism, has breathed some life into socialist rhetoric in Latin America, and the FARC has attempted to latch onto and incorporate it into some of its statements. But this does not seem to have improved its mobilization capacity. The various deals to divide up the drug territories as spoils of war between the FARC and its sworn enemies, the rightist paramilitaries, further strengthened the perception that ideology was no longer a part of the conflict. The decision in the mid-1990s of the FARC’s recently deceased leader Manuel Marulanda to institute self-financing for each of FARC’s operational units only raised the importance of the various illicit economies in the belligerents’ overall strategy. Profits are not used mainly for personal enrichment but for the funding of the war machine. This is not to say, however, that drugs are not seen as a crucial means to allow the struggle to be undertaken. Thus, the presence of coca cultivation in a particular locale is frequently a magnet for the FARC and other groups seeking to dominate that territory and control the drug trade in the area. By contrast, the Taliban’s ideology is not only more clearly defined — a mixture of nationalism and religious fundamentalism — but more intensely felt by many of its leaders and even rank-and-file combatants. At the top level, the Taliban’s leadership council, which is known as Quetta Shura and is led by Mullah Omar, is probably most intensely driven by an ideological compulsion based on a fundamentalist vision of Afghanistan. During the past few years, as this core leadership has become more closely aligned with al-Qaida — facilitated by their shared refuge in Pakistan and their shared identification of the enemy as the U.S. and NATO and the NATO-supported Afghan government — Mullah Omar’s embrace of the global Salafism, or Islamic fundamentalism, has also become more prominent. The network led by Jalaluddin and Sirajuddin Haqqani in eastern Afghanistan is fairly strongly motivated by the extremist cause. Although the members of the network finance their operations by participating in illicit logging and timber smuggling to Pakistan, the financial profits from the illicit economy clearly remain only a means to support their ideological project. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s network also participates in a variety of Afghanistan’s illicit economic sectors. But Hekmatyar is less motivated by an ideology of any sort and more focused on personal power accumulation and profits. THE EVOLUTION OF THE FARC’S AND TALIBAN’S ATTITUDES TOWARD THE DRUG ECONOMY When the FARC first encountered the coca economy in the Caguán region in the late 1970s, it decided to prohibit it on Marxist-Communist grounds as a social vice. Immediately, its policy toward the illicit coca economy generated widespread dislike of the group because part of the population was dependent on it. last_img read more

Petition started to bring ‘Safe Ride’ back to Binghamton University’s campus

Petition started to bring ‘Safe Ride’ back to Binghamton University’s campus

first_imgThe university announced due to COVID-19 they will be discontinuing the program. In the petition, students are demanding the university bring the program back to think about student’s safety first. R.J. Fox, Binghamton University junior, says there have been times he’s had to help his peers get back to their dorms late at night. The university did say university police will provide walking escorts for anyone who does not feel safe walking on campus. “Safe Ride” is a free service students can call between 9 p.m. and 3 a.m. to be escorted back to their dorms, if they ever feel unsafe on campus. VESTAL (WBNG) — There is a petition to bring Binghamton University’s “Safe Ride” program back to campus. “I know that there are people who don’t feel comfortable or safe walking across campus by themselves at night,” Fox said. “That’s why I think “Safe Ride” is a great tool for students, and I think it’s a necessity.” last_img read more

Herts Industrial Thriving from healthy demand

Herts Industrial Thriving from healthy demand

first_imgWould you like to read more?Register for free to finish this article.Sign up now for the following benefits:Four FREE articles of your choice per monthBreaking news, comment and analysis from industry experts as it happensChoose from our portfolio of email newsletters To access this article REGISTER NOWWould you like print copies, app and digital replica access too? SUBSCRIBE for as little as £5 per week.last_img

PSSI inspects Greater Bandung stadiums ahead of U-20 World Cup

PSSI inspects Greater Bandung stadiums ahead of U-20 World Cup

first_img“So the stadium remains relatively dry during the rainy season. Besides, the fact that it is near the city is a strong point,” he said.A field that belonged to the Army field artillery battalion of the Siliwangi Military Command was the second place to be inspected. From there, the entourage also visited a field located within the Indonesia Education University (UPI) complex, Sabuga field at the Bandung Institute of Technology, Siliwangi Stadium, Arcamanik Stadium and the fields of Padjajaran University and the Home Affairs Administration Institute.Iriawan acknowledged that local administrations had vital roles in the preparations as they were expected to prepare not only the stadiums but also infrastructure.“The event is significant for our younger generation as it is a stage for them to improve and hone their skills,” he said.He said inspections would also be done in cities that had been nominated as hosts. They are Yogyakarta, Bekasi, Surabaya, Bali, Bogor, Surakarta and Palembang.“We plan to add another city, Pekanbaru, to be a host,” Iriawan said.  Topics : As part of preparations for the 2021 U-20 World Cup in Indonesia, Soccer Association of Indonesia (PSSI) chief Comr. Gen. M. Iriawan inspected a number of soccer stadiums in Greater Bandung.“This is being done in accordance with orders from President Joko Widodo to prepare for the event,” Iriawan said on Sunday.Iriawan first inspected Si Jalak Harupat Stadium in Soreang, Bandung regency, which had been set as a venue for the 2018 Asian Games qualifiers. Bandung Regent Dadang Nasser,who was present during the inspection, said the stadium was not prone to flooding.  last_img read more

Indonesia interested in joining WHO’s multinational trial for COVID-19 treatments

Indonesia interested in joining WHO’s multinational trial for COVID-19 treatments

first_imgAs of Saturday, more than 275,000 people from 166 countries and regions had been infected, with more than 11,000 dead, according to data compiled by the Johns Hopkins University Center for Systems Science and Engineering.Indonesia alone recorded 450 confirmed cases and 38 deaths by Saturday afternoon, according to the Health Ministry.Acep Somantri, the ministry’s international cooperation bureau head, said he had met with a WHO representative in Jakarta on Friday to discuss the details of the multi-country trial and how Indonesia could participate.“We see this program to be very good for global health and one that will help accelerate clinical trials of several drugs and vaccines for COVID-19,” Acep told The Jakarta Post on Friday. As the world races to find a vaccine for the coronavirus, Indonesia has expressed interest in participating in a World Health Organization-led clinical trial to study potential COVID-19 treatments.WHO Director General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus announced on Wednesday what he called a solidarity trial, a multi-country study to analyze untested treatments to speed the search for potential therapies and drugs for the coronavirus. “This large international study is designed to generate the robust data we need to show which treatments are the most effective,” he said. He said that, with the program, it would be possible for countries to share the best practices of other treatment programs they ran.There are currently no vaccines or treatments approved for the disease, but researchers are studying existing treatments and working on experimental ones. At the moment, most patients can only receive supportive care.Argentina, Bahrain, Canada, France, Iran, Norway, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland and Thailand have confirmed their participation in the WHO trial.The study aims to provide reliable estimates on the effects of antiviral treatments. It will also assess the effects of such antivirals on duration of hospital stay and intensive care.The study will be conducted simultaneously in each participating country and will randomly test five treatments, namely the usual standard care, the remdesivir, the lopinavir/ritonavir, the lopinavir/ritonavir plus interferon, and the chloroquine, measuring their effectiveness. It will be monitored by an independent global data and safety monitoring committee and would be administered randomly to patients.The program does not set out any specific sample size, emphasizing that the greater the enrollment, the more accurate the results will be. “But the numbers that can be entered will depend critically on how large the epidemic becomes,” according to the protocol of the solidarity trial.“We see that it is important for us to support and participate in this program. We are going to join the program through WHO Indonesia, starting with remdesivir,” Acep said.Remdesivir, an antiviral treatment made by United States-based Gilead Sciences, is in the final stages of clinical trials in Asia and doctors in China have reported it as effective in fighting the disease, according to AFP. Among numerous vaccines and treatments under development, remdesivir is the closest to market availability. It was originally developed for use against the Ebola virus. The drugmaker is expected to report early results of tests of the experimental medicine in April.Acep said that the trial in Indonesia would be led by the Health Ministry’s Health Research and Development Agency (Balitbangkes) and “of course will involve experts and hospitals”.”We are waiting for further guidance from WHO,” he said.Chairul Anwar Nidom, the chair of Airlangga University’s Avian Influenza Research Center, warned that such trials should not ignore the safety of the patients.“It is acceptable – not permissible – but acceptable [to start trialing new drugs] given the [serious] threat of the outbreak. But we cannot ignore the safety of patients who are trialed with the drugs. We don’t want this to have dual purposes – humanitarian and commercial interests,” he said.Nafrialdi from the Clinical Research Support Unit at the University of Indonesia’s School of Medicine said if Indonesia participated in the WHO-led study, there would be various protocols that could be shortened, but it should not overlook the ethical aspects.“The most important thing is informed consent from the patient, so they have to know what the goals are and what the possible side effects are. This is the standard, and most families would sign up for that,” he said.Experts have also pointed out that even though the medicines had shown good results in other countries, the drugs might not work for the Indonesian people, who live in a tropical climate.Such concern was raised last week when President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo said the government planned to import two kinds of medicines that were reportedly effective in fighting the disease, namely Avigan – commonly used to treat COVID-19 patients in Japan – and chloroquine.Jokowi said the government had imported 5,000 packs of Avigan while ordering 2 million more. There were also 3 million packs of chloroquine available, which is believed to help fight COVID-19, even though an antivirus has yet to be discovered.Both of the medicines have not been clinically proven to stop COVID-19, but medical personnel in several countries have been using Avigan and chloroquine to treat symptoms in patients.Nidom said it would actually take two to three years of testing before a drug could be commercially marketed, and it would take much longer to find a vaccine, normally around seven years.Topics :last_img read more

Lundin picks up drilling permit for another Alta appraisal well

Lundin picks up drilling permit for another Alta appraisal well

first_imgThe Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) has granted Lundin Norway a drilling permit for an appraisal well in the Barents Sea, offshore Norway.The well 7220/11-4 A will be drilled from the Leiv Eiriksson drilling rig in production license 609.The license is operated by Lundin Norway with an ownership interest of 40 percent. The licensees in the license are Idemitsu Petroleum Norge with 30 percent and DEA Norge with the remaining 30 percent.The area in this license consists of the blocks and parts of blocks 7220/6, 7220/9, 7220/11, 7220/12, and 7221/4. The well will be drilled about two kilometers south of the discovery well 7220/11-1 on the Alta discovery.To remind, Lundin spud the 7220/11-4, known as Alta-4, in May. The main objective of the Alta-4 well was to further appraise the Alta discovery and provide a calibration point for the drilling of a horizontal well for a possible extended well test that is being planned for 2018.The Alta discovery is estimated to contain gross contingent resources of between 125 and 400 million barrels of oil equivalents (MMboe).As far as the rig is concerned, the Leiv Eiriksson is a semi-submersible drilling rig of the SS Trosvik Bingo 9000 type, owned by Ocean Rig and operated by Rig Management Norway. The drilling rig was issued with an Acknowledgement of Compliance (AoC) by the PSA in July 2008.last_img read more

ADB to advise on Philippines’ $2 billion LNG project

ADB to advise on Philippines’ $2 billion LNG project

first_imgThe Asian Development Bank (ADB) said on Tuesday it has signed an agreement with the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) to act as transaction advisor for the Philippines’ first LNG hub project in Batangas.The transaction advisory services agreement was signed by Takeo Koike, Officer-in-Charge of ADB’s Office of Public-Private Partnership (OPPP), and Reuben S. Lista, President and Chief Executive Officer of PNOC at a ceremony in Manila.“The Philippines’ first LNG hub will help in ensuring long-term energy security to the Philippines and source a cleaner energy resource,” said Siddhartha Shah, Principal PPP Specialist. “It will also increase energy access and create new demand in the power, transportation, and industrial sectors in Luzon and in neighboring islands.”Given the imminent depletion of domestic gas reserves at the Malampaya gas field in Palawan, which provides a substantial amount of power supply in the country, PNOC is developing a robust and sustainable gas supply strategy through the establishment of an LNG hub in Batangas, ADB said in its statement.Under the agreement, ADB’s OPPP will advise and assist PNOC in all aspects of the project, including the award and execution of the final project agreements.The project, which could cost up to $2 billion, will consist of a regasification terminal, storage, power plant, and other related infrastructure.last_img read more